What is democratic minimalism?
To begin it is necessary to untangle what Hamid means by democratic minimalism. In his book The problem of Democracy he notes that democracy has become ‘increasingly ill-defined’ and rails against the ideologization of democracy (Hamid 2022 pg.44). For Hamid, democracy is diffused from its output and is rather merely a procedural method of deciding who governs outside the realm of violence. Citing its value in its procedural aspect, democratic minimalism finds the value of democracy even when ‘bad’ results are to be found. An easy example could be of the Brexit referendum in the UK in 2016 which many liberals would consider bad for the economy and the Uk’s relations with numerous partners across the continent.
“At their core, democracies offer one essential advantage: they allow for the peaceful alternation of power and the regulation of existential conflict.” (Hamid 2022 pg.44).
Democratic minimalism fights the liberal-democratic notion of protected rights outside the boundary of participation in elections and civic society. By ringfencing increasingly large sections of politics as outside the ‘democratic domain’ the value of democracy wilts in favour of an ideological perception of what constitutes ‘good outcomes’. As a result, democracy becomes a mere instrumental good rather than a force in itself for making political choices. Hamid’s claim goes beyond merely suggesting that ideological notions mute the power of democracy but that they actually contribute to a rise of distrust in democracy (Hamid 2022).
“Counterintuitively, thickening the democratic idea—making it more substantive than procedural—had the effect of diluting the force of democracy, or at least democracy without adjectives.” (Hamid 2022 pg.49)
“This all matters because as democracy grows distant from other goods that we hold dearer, it loses its allure, and those who would otherwise consider themselves democrats lose faith. And they are losing faith.” (Hamid 2022 pg.50)
Thus, the sole focus for democratic minimalism is securing the legitimacy of governance. For Hamid this is especially true in societies ridden with political conflicts as common ends can rarely if ever be found. Far from seeking unity and agreement, democratic minimalism calls for us to embrace our differences and fight it out. It is ultimately a quest of experimentation, difference, and recognising procedural rules fundamental to democracy. Therefore we arrive at the somewhat paradoxical notion of finding stability and the peaceful transfer of government while actively embracing our substantive political differences.
“For the opponents of any given government, democracy offers predictability, since losers of elections have the chance to fight another day, as long as they are willing to fight peacefully” (Hamid 2022 pg.54)
Trumpism
The rise of Trump is witness to rebellions not only on democratic but also on cultural and economic fronts. Trump represents the apex of democratic politics confronting long-held liberal norms which have guided not just the American Republic but also western politics more broadly. This can be witnessed not only in the domestic context but also the foreign policy context where we can see Trump’s aversion to liberal democratic norms manifest itself with admiration for alternative regime types. What we see with Trump is that even when a democratic mandate presents itself such movements when separated from liberal limits eventually become anti-democratic.
The United States has a robust set of constitutional principles which are widely admired in the country even though debate over what they mean remains fierce. The constitution remains a hindrance to truly democratic law-making by providing significant binding capabilities over governments at both a state and federal level (Brown 2022). Indeed, we have seen state legislatures through the use of gerrymandering make it increasingly difficult to change political majorities through procedural democracy and constitutional laws protect minority led initiatives limiting majoritarian rule (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2023). The US therefore should not be seen as a procedural democratic paradise but a political system which has institutional mechanisms thwarting democratic will already in place.
Despite this, there are challenges to such institutions. The digital revolution spurred on such anger creating discourse in particular silos ripping away shared assumptions and commonly held facts which used to bind citizens together. In this environment, illiberal regimes can thrive even with the support of a minority. Candidates challenging the established order, such as Donald Trump, can label journalists ‘enemies of the people’, attack ‘fake news’ and delegitimize his opponents (Shattuck 2018). This positioning can be procedurally democratic but threatens the foundation stones of said democracy by attacking the guardrails limiting anti-democratic rulership to take over.
By portraying popular will as the primary and ultimate source of popular authority, illiberal movements erode even well entrenched institutional structures upholding constitutional notions of democracy (Smilova 2021). Naturally, this effects not simply the messaging of illiberal politics but also the lengths and institutional mechanisms they are willing to use to sustain their rulership. Trump has used the language of democracy to background his anti-liberal politics of nationalism and ethnic chauvinism (Vibhav and Nooruddin 2023). Trumpism in its formation has become increasingly anti-democratic challenging the foundations of the liberal US state (Frum and Foster 2018).
Trump’s belief in his total authority is a significant threat to the constitutional order. Yet, his power stems not from party elites as is traditional but from the grassroots of the Republican Party. Trump’s repeated attacks on the institutions of government and constitutional order thus cannot be framed as an aristocratic or elite based politics but a reflection of democratic needs and wants amongst a segment of the population. This can be seen from his strong approval ratings amongst the Republican rank and file which consistently hits in the high 80’s-low 90’s (Gardner 2020).
Political movements seeking to differentiate between certain groups of people have a tendency to eventually do away with procedural democracy. The litany of false claims made by Trump, clocked at over 30,000 during his presidency, pollutes the information vital for a democracy to function. If we cannot find truth, or truth is deemed to be unknowable, then by what measure can we judge the performance of our politicians? How can we judge elections to be free? How can we trust our fellow citizens? (Dunwoody et al., 2022). Effecting our ability to judge popular will, Trumpism and the environment it swims in unmoors people from reality.
Therefore, as Liberman et al., (2019) argues Trumpism can have a democratic base while also threatening core pillars of democracy at home. This paradox, common in illiberal political movements creates difficulty for liberal regimes. The rise of illiberal ‘democratic’ regimes highlights the limits of values without institutional safeguards and exercise (Cooley and Nexon 2022). Trump’s revolt against liberal norms stems across not just domestic politics but international politics too. Trump has undermined traditional alliances and in return sought to better balance US interests without ideological anchors further weakening the US’s democratic character (Karkour 2021).
Trump’s appreciation of authoritarian regimes speaks to a man who is untethered from liberal democratic norms. Instead, he values the imposition of personal will onto a constitutional and political order. This feeling represents a crossover with other ‘illiberal democratic’ regimes such as Hungary’s Orban who sees his regime confronting liberal values via democratic opposition (Peterson 2018). The result without sufficient institutional restriction is the demolition of the democratic process which brought them to power in the first place. Here we can see the power of movement within long-held norms when unrestrained institutionally creating political movements which can begin democratically but end denying procedural democracy.
Trumpism should be seen as a movement which initially was procedurally democratic but increasingly moved towards anti-democratic trends and ideas. Removed from liberal restraints, Trump idealised anti-democratic leaders and sought to mimic their behaviour. The Trump movement highlights the instability in anti-liberal political movements towards procedural democracy. Far from merely being anti-liberal wariness is necessary as to the potential not only of radicalisation for political movements but the danger to procedural democracy when sufficiently strong liberal safeguards are not enacted.
The Dangers of a ‘minimalist state’
The danger discussed here is not the danger of a liberal state, oftentimes associated with the classically liberal notion of the ‘night watchman, or ‘neutral’ state, rather it is the danger of the state which is insufficiently activist in safeguarding rights and duties key to liberal democracies functioning. Given illiberal democracies use not only of the communal good and ‘aristocratic’ virtues if the state is insufficiently activist there is a danger of majoritarian will overrunning protected classes of behaviour and groups. Indeed, once such movements get into power we can witness the erosion of the space for democratic will to formulate itself under the notions of common good. A minimalist state becomes oxymoronic destroying itself in the process of protecting almost unlimited pluralism.
Democracy can come in various constitutional and institutional guises with the word defying the constraints of a singular conception. Yet, we may think of some basic rules necessary for definitions including effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of all adults which even procedural democracies must recognise (Dahl 2020, Galperin 2024). This is why despite concerns over measuring democratic backsliding due to definitional opaqueness concern Knutsen et al., (2024), we can reasonably assert when democracies break away from such grounding then it challenges the benchmarks of democracy.
Given the modern state retains distinctive and significant powers of coercion when it applies its will forcefully it is difficult for citizens to escape its demands. When the state is too hierarchical this fastens up democratic difference and disagreement potentially destroying the values which are purported by the state in the first place (Anscombe 1990, Laski 2010). Therefore, while the common good cannot genuinely be found via pressure, either institutional or social, neither can conditions be allowed to deteriorate so we cannot find such a good. It in this space where coercion can be justified (Hobhouse 2010).
There are those, such as Kukathas (2003), who argue steadfastly for broader toleration. Espousing a radical conception of toleration, Kukathas imagines a world where toleration takes hold via a knitted network of communities which neuters the power of overbearing forces. Yet, toleration can open a dangerous door through which abuses can take place. Not only because of the abuses which scholars such as Barry (2002) highlight but the value neutral application as identified also by Barry (1990) making it unlikely to hold. Indeed as Acer et al., (2024) have claimed tolerance alone can appear as threatening in of itself making the notion of the ‘neutral state’ not simply paradoxical but oxymoronic. However, Acer et al., (2024) only consider toleration in relation to social identity such as sexual minorities or refugees rather than overtly political minorities.
The question also must come as to when do we stop tolerating? With a criminal this is an easy question- when they break the law… but for political movements this is a much harder question. As Carvalho and Sacks (2023) argue groups radicalise via cultural purification creating more extreme versions of themselves. How can liberal democracies then tell when political groups move from a procedurally democratic stance to one which seeks to dispense with safeguards even for minimalistic democracy? The notions of value neutral government as Van De Wall (2024) highlights drift over time but just as neutrality drift depending upon the contextual background so should toleration.
Popper’s famous paradox of tolerating the intolerant is not sufficient here for it also falls foul of the notion of political movement (Smith and Kerr 2019). Popper’s thesis rests on the idea that we can adequately identify and dispense with those movements which move from tolerable to intolerable. In such a minimalistic environment the state could sleepwalk towards the death of democracy with no-one daring to shout the alarm. While scholars such as Kuna (2024) are sympathetic to the notion the state cannot be trusted to regulate political activity this negates the reality that the state is always in charge of political activity even when they decide to be ‘hands off’. Thus, the question is not ‘should’ we trust the state to act but ‘when’ should we trust the state to use its coercive capacity.
The emergence of hyperpolarisation by casting citizens as enemies quickly moves towards questioning even procedural democracy as advocated for by Hamid in democratic minimalism. When majorities, such as in the US, are given control and power over the electoral process this becomes particularly dangerous for the survival of procedural democracy (Gaughan 2016). Procedural democracy rests upon the decision to uphold it- it cannot sustain itself upon ideals alone creating necessarily a live relationship between these two ideals which must be acted out. Liberal Democratic states therefore should not be tolerant at all costs and shouldn’t be overly shy in exercising their coercive powers to secure its future against emerging threats. Democratic minimalism poses a potential problem in tolerating political movements which not only seek an alternative value set but undermine key features of democratic rule as highlighted in previous sections.
Democracy destroying itself
While universalists do exist, even universalists must engage their universal ideas with the world around them. Thus, democracy cannot merely exist in the abstract but must be engaged with on the ground. Those who treat ideas with ultimate relativism are in danger of being swallowed by politics at the expense of their values (Barber 1988). This is precisely the critique Alisdair Macintyre poses of modern liberalism as they are philosophically unable to ground the common good beyond mere preference (Martinez-Hernandez 2024). But the same argument can be used to ground necessary support for democracy to adequately function. If we acknowledge, like Hamid does, that democracy has to sustain some core properties for it to remain democracy we therefore can also acknowledge when democracy either comes under threat, is diluted, or at the very edge of cases destroyed.
It may be presumed somewhat hubristic to claim without liberalism democracy will collapse in on itself and choosing to be fearful may be somewhat overstated (Macpherson 1979). Galperin (2024) highlights the lack of broader substantive commitment in minimal democracy but fails to question does minimal democracy in order to function require a broader commitment to protect and safeguard its minimalistic qualities? As outlined previously in the paper the very real threats not only to the ideological core of states but their commitment to procedural democracy should not be understated. Democracy has before and will again destroy itself procedurally if liberal regimes are not sufficiently strong in confronting their aggressors.
Without sufficient capacity for action liberal democracies cannot sustain themselves (Pugh 2014). Typically argued through the lens of neo-colonial western intervention into non-Western states this argument penetrates the universalising attempts of liberal democracy. However, such capacity should also be measured at home rather than abroad. Institutions are simply made up of people, if too many people no longer have the will to protect liberal safeguards they will inevitably fall by the wayside. Democracy requires a certain liberal capacity to retain its functioning when there are democratically ‘grey’ movements which began as democratic but moved towards something else.
After-all, institutional design and veneration are insufficient for success. All institutions exist in and are moulded by their context and when they stop producing results must be deemed to have faced demise in practice if not in form (Barber 2014). If this is true for constitutions as Barber suggests then the same must go for democracy. Just as constitutions can still technically ‘live’ while losing their operational reality so goes democracy. If ‘democracy’ is to keep such a title then even minimalistic conceptions must bear the weight of such demands.
Just as there is no need to pretend we need a ‘crystal ball’ approach, it is necessary for democracies to defend themselves procedurally from anticipated threats. While scholars, such as Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D., (2024), argue many radical right parties have an antagonistic relationship with liberal democracy even if not procedural democracy itself on the surface this neglects the potential for movement in radical right circles. Without sufficiently strong institutional guardrails how can radical movements seeking to overturn constitutional orders be trusted to retain their commitment to procedural democracy?
Predicated upon a relationship between the citizen and the state, democracy is not a static but a fluid and everyday relationship. Thus, democracies like anything else can become stronger or weaker over time. Scholars such as Volacu and Aligica (2023) focus on the notion of democratic resilience arguing we can only know after a challenge has been made. This logic is somewhat faulty as we can gauge just how close to the precipice institutions may be by the types and popularity of such challenges emerge such as with the rise of Donald Trump in America and Fidesz in Hungary. It seems reasonable to say we can judge when procedural democracy is coming under threat- the success of a challenge is irrelevant to the initial threat which is made.
Hamid (2022) here goes halfway as discussed earlier but locates such protections institutionally and at a low level of liberal values which are insufficient to safeguard the foundations of procedural democracy. Far from pretending there is a contestation between liberalism and democracy as argued by Mouffe (2006) via her ‘agonistic model’ this paper contends for democracy to survive liberalism is the essential background feature. Arguments such as Mouffe’s (1997, 2006) agonism act as little more than a democratic boomerang which lets febrile politics off the institutional hook undermining liberal governance principles. Conflict to some extent is inevitable in democratic societies but it needs to be closely contained lest it spill over.
While August (2024) and August and Westphal (2024) recognise Mouffe’s failure to account for conflicts spilling over their solution is not ideal as they cite current democracies as useful outside of agonism to de-escalate conflicts by using a variety of techniques such as cross-cutting, differentiated conflict arrangements and diversion creating burnout. Yet, this argument fails to fully address the very real difficulties which liberal democracies have found themselves in where they have been unable to either resolve conflict or produce democratic stability. This argument also does not reflect the power of the state to exert its coercive capacity to dampen if not resolve conflict.
This brings us to the question of fear. Just as fear has been ostracised it is useful to remember Skinner’s argument that one should not be bound by tradition when thinking conceptually (Owen 2024). The notion of fear has been widely distrusted with scholars such as Gray (2000) positing that universalistic doctrines such as liberalism operationalise fear of the other narrowing the scope of genuine experiments in governance. As we can see via Walker and Markel (2024) and Weeks et al., (2024) it is not only a hypothetical claim but one rooted in experience where beliefs about submergence create hostile reactions to the other. In the case of Christian Nationalism fear was rooted against mobilisation creating feelings of disgust.
Fear therefore can be an effective tool of political management depending on the community in question in relation to political extremism. As Nai and Maier (2024) have argued fear is mostly used by extreme candidates which is unsurprising. But what about the utilisation of fear against such candidates? Fear is pigeonholed as a negative tool but it can also be used in defence of an ideal i.e., a positive tool such as during covid where fear of the virus saved lives.
The lack of fear has had a negative effect in crisis management such as the covid pandemic which led to politicians dithering rather than enacting lockdowns swiftly (Dagerman et al., 2023). As Mehlhaff et al., (2024) have argued in times of emergency such as the pandemic this can break partisan lines where supporters of one group can adopt measures from the other group. Applying the concept of legitimate fear outside pandemics, we can assert we should sometimes be afraid of illiberal movements who may move to attack procedural democracy. Just as with the covid pandemic, rather than waiting for the virus to spread and infect more people, liberal democracies should shut off avenues of infection if they wish to survive.
It is not only in formal movements where we can see this fear emerge but also in informal structures. Take for instance the attempt to deny women and girls appropriate education and freedoms so they can live their lives as they wish by some traditional communities. (Almagor 2023). Despite Almagor (2023) highlighting the possibility of non-liberal constitutionalism, although recognising the injustice of gender apartheid even when presented in constitutional form, this ignores the danger of actively illiberal constitutional structures and their potential movement. Should minorities not be afraid of such movement and exercise said fear via organisation by the state?
Trump’s support from Republican grassroots rather than a party “elite” is, however, offset by the fact he gained power through a sophisticated and qualified democratic system, not through a simple plurality of votes. He won 46 per cent of a 60 per cent turnout, two per cent less than his opponent, so cannot invoke a “purer” or more direct form of democratic mandate.