Taking Illiberalism seriously
part 1 of 2
Dear Readers,
I must apologise for my absence. Unfortunately, the combination of moving house and extreme amounts of marking has ensured I have not been able to write as I would have liked. However, these distractions have now disappeared into the night so here is my latest. I hope you enjoy my latest offering!
In 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the speedy collapse of communism that followed liberal theorists were proclaiming the beginning of a new era. The third wave of democracy was supposed to change the world and for a brief period of time, it did. Yet, the optimism which defined that era has given way to fears over the future. Now we live in an era of catastrophe where democratic decline mirrors the arrival of fascism in the 1930’s.
Of course, there are problems with this analysis. We do not live in the 1930s and fascism has been a word much overused disregarding genuine differences of regime type for an easy description. No one should fall into this trap but neither should we look away from danger where it presents itself and let’s be honest there is plenty of danger right now. Whether it be Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China showing its teeth on Taiwan, a rogue Trump Presidency, or North Korea’s nuclear threat Illiberal regimes are resurging both domestically and internationally.
Illiberal regimes are not simply posing new challenges to liberalism but the ideology itself feels bereft. Liberal democracy is in a crisis at home because it fails to justify itself ideologically while indulging anti-democratic and illiberal actors abroad during its 90s and early noughties heydays. History did not end, perhaps it is closer to being on a loop than we may like to think and we should forget the idealistic notion that the arc of history simply bends towards justice. Such lofty ideals need to be traded for a harder realist mindset.
The rise and fall of democracies across Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa has led many to cite a democratic recession which plagued liberal democracies following the 2008 financial crisis. More recently there appears to be a swing in the opposite direction given the fightback of actors in Poland, Brazil and others. As a result, some fears have been alleviated about the true state of democracy around the world.
“Those same commentators observe that ‘[r]ather than overnight breakdown, democratic backsliding is a drawn-out death by a thousand cuts, in which power-hungry executives slice away at the fundamental institutional checks and balances in ways that ultimately distort pluralism and political competition” (Matlosa 2023)
Indeed, there are those who doubted the fear of decline in the first place. Citing not only the continued strength of democracies worldwide in comparison to even 30 years ago but also overoptimistic interpretations of authoritarian backsliding the strength of the supposed third wave for democracy remains questionable. Although many countries witnessed the reformation of institutions as Lionel Barber reminds us institutions are inherently moulded by their context. Liberalising institutions does not inherently foster democratic outcomes nor is it a sustainable practice on its own. Democracy is a flesh and blood exercise requiring deep roots to manage crises when they inevitably emerge something which institutions cannot grant us.
For that we need resilience. Although resilience as a terminology criss-crosses multiple domains its characteristics remain similar- the ability to handle stressors while maintaining their fundamental quality. Resilience thus is the polar opposite of backsliding i.e., losing features as challenges emerge. The problem with gauging resilience, especially after the third wave of democracy, is that it can only be tested when challenges present themselves. We cannot foresee how liberal democracies will fare until they run into trouble.
The rise of electoral authoritarianism as a growing phenomenon is such a test. Increasingly, we see candidates refusing to grant loser’s consent in elections. Refusing to abide by the rules of the democratic game creates an anti-democratic element inside the democratic system itself. This remains true of both winners and losers who seek to challenge and reshape institutions which protects democratic sustainability.
Although many of us may cringe or even laugh when actors deny they have lost and seek to challenge results it should be no laughing matter. As witnessed in America even citizens who claim to support democracy back such candidates creating an illusory and paradoxical effect of participating in elections yet rejecting their results. Republican voters in the United States have grown more willing to accept rejections of democratic results undermining their commitment to it.
This new reality of electoral denialism should remind us that the features of democracy can be mimicked. This is not new amongst authoritarians, such as President Sisi of Egypt who regularly use ‘elections’ as a means of justifying their authoritarian rule. Outside of the Sisi’s and Putin’s whose elections are clear shams we should be wary of the ballot being used as a pretext to disestablish institutions and traditions which safeguard democracy. Instead, the ballot can be used to usher in so-called ‘hybrid’ models of authoritarianism which lack civil society, a true free press, or oversight of the regime.
Hungary is a good example of this. The ballot remains but elections struggle to be truly competitive. Democratic backsliding does not necessarily include an overthrow via violence, coups, or rigging elections Handmaid’s Tale style. It can also include those who genuinely do win an election but slowly restricts democratic choice and freedoms. Even those who consider ballots sufficient to sustain democracy have to ask themselves about the background features sustaining the ballot in the first place.
We must not conflate stability for consolidation. Democracies can remain democracies for periods of time without concretising themselves institutionally with safeguards to stop backsliding. Instead, we must consider democracies a living thing made of flesh and blood and subject to change even when institutions are created. This is not only true of domestic politics but international affairs.
“Human beings are rule-following animals by nature; they are born to conform to the social norms they see around them, and they entrench those rules with often transcendent meaning and value. When the surrounding environment changes and new challenges arise, there is often a disjunction between existing institutions and present needs. Those institutions are supported by legions of entrenched stakeholders who oppose any fundamental change.” (Fukuyama)
We live in a world unlike ones which has come before us. The 20th century gave us one failed and one more successful attempt at creating an international order resembling some form of law. Arriving out of the ruins of the Second World War the allies constructed not only a scaffold by which to judge those who fell afoul of our common humanity but helped to imagine a new world order. Of course, there was hypocrisy undermining the worthy declarations of courtrooms dispatching war criminals to prison or to hell and this hypocrisy arguably remains today.
As John Ikenberry has highlighted the liberal international order is built upon a long history of hypocrisy with colonialism and the perceived right to act. We do not need to remove ourselves from the 19th and early 20th centuries when states occupied others and called it a civilizing mission. The US’s actions during the war on terror, not merely confined to the invasion of Iraq but the development of so-called ‘advanced interrogation techniques’ highlighted the limitations of norms when confronted with raw power. Liberal vengeance can be powerful when exercised against those unwilling to submit to the liberal order.
Such hypocrisy opens the door to nefarious actors, such as the current Russian regime, using the same language to justify their crimes. It also undermines the West’s claims to be a united actor guided by pure notions of safety, freedom, and democracy granting illiberal dastardly regimes if not the benefit of the doubt then the right to say ‘we are all the same’. To demonstrate difference we must not only act differently but coherently and seriously in tackling genuine threats abroad.
The post-Cold war moment has certainly passed and our international institutions are in crisis with even former employees slating the UN’s approach to conflict resolution. The reality of the Security Council veto and the growing influence of authoritarian regimes limits the capability of liberal democracies to put up a strong united front. Indeed, crises at home whether economic or political, also limit the liberal democratic vanguard’s capability in securing the world from growing threats.
But this is not to give up hope. International institutions have not only imposed economic penalties but have developed mechanisms to deny state sovereignty when regimes overstep the mark. The development of Responsibility to Protect following the Rwandan genocide highlighted limitations on Westphalian norms of sovereignty which even non-liberal states signed up to. Used in Libya to defeat the Gaddafi regime the international norm retains genuine weight even if not widespread acceptance. R2P itself is subject to the institutional limitations of the UN itself.
Rather than liberal hegemonic states having the power to decide action R2P is wrapped up inside institutional structures such as the Security Council where illiberal regimes continue to have significant power. Inevitably the consequences of this are significant and severe. Inviting the fox into the liberal henhouse has created numerous problems for international institutions. Far from curating an international order which promotes human rights, justice, and equality for all, we now exist in a world where authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes exist without real checks.
Inevitably by including non-liberal and non-democratic regimes inside the liberal system this effects the scope of action which can be taken. The collection of authoritarian regimes with little regard for law in their own countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia can hardly be counted upon to care about law in the international system. The hopeful notion of greater inclusion and interconnectedness curating a liberal internationalism has not come to pass. It can even be said those continuing the hopes for increased liberalization are merely burying their heads in the sand.
“Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes)
Just as many initially found Trump’s run for the Republican nomination as something to laugh at all too often we do the same with states such as North Korea. There is little chance of North Korea gaining genuine acceptance amongst populations of liberal democracies but there is a danger of underestimating them. Despite being impoverished the North has significant numbers of nuclear weapons and this has grown over time because of a concerted effort. They also possess a strong diplomatic core which has leveraged fears over a nuclear Korea into significant amounts of aid without giving up anything.
North Korean involvement in Ukraine is the most publicised foray into the danger zone but North Korea has been involved in the exchange of deadly materials and expertise to Iran and Syria. Integrating significant parts of its economy not only into nuclear weapons but the manufacture and sale of weapons the regime in Pyongyang represents a duel risk. Not only does its growing nuclear arsenal and aggressive rhetoric towards their neighbours in the south but its closer relationships with both China and Russia should make liberal democracies everywhere shudder. It has also developed sophisticated hacking capabilities to help fund its heavily sanctioned regime which the Chinese have long helped them evade. The regime has also used its capabilities to blackmail companies who dare mock it highlighting not only its dangerousness but also its pettiness.
There are crises both at home and abroad. Generally, we fail to take them seriously until it is too late. Trump was a joke until he went and won not only the Republican nomination but the Presidency. North Korea is a decrepit regimes enduring almost unimaginable poverty with much misinformation about its domestic politics pervading popular outlets. Yet, they have a nuclear arsenal which could level not just South Korea but much of the pacific if tested and have troops on the ground in Eastern Europe.
Liberals can no longer pretend institutions at home or abroad are enough on their own. The world is no longer a uni-polar or bi-polar entity but a messy multi-polar one which is breaking down international norms and law. In thirty years the world has moved from looking bright and forward to the future to cowering at the potential possibilities.
“The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides)
look out for next week for part 2!